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INTRODUCTION 
In 2014, New York City launched its ambitious LinkNYC public-
private partnership to replace the city’s public payphones with 
citywide internet service.  The city granted a new franchise agreement 
to the private companies behind LinkNYC, which would then install 
thousands of sidewalk kiosks to bathe the city in free high-speed 
wireless internet (“Wi-Fi”).  The program would allow the city to 
accomplish two goals: bridge the digital divide and make New York a 
more modern “smart city.”  In exchange, LinkNYC’s backers would 
receive lucrative advertising revenue. 
But LinkNYC also had a potentially sinister side: the specter of a 
mass surveillance network of cameras and sensors for law 
enforcement to follow New Yorkers wherever they went.  A public 
outcry erupted.  In response, LinkNYC changed its privacy policy to 
curtail the amount of information the kiosks could collect.  With these 
changes in place, the network’s deployment has continued unabated, 
even as some concerns still linger about what data, exactly, the kiosks 
collect, with whom the data is shared, and how the data is used. 
The changing privacy policy showed both the promise and the 
limits of relying on voluntary privacy policies to protect New Yorkers 
from mass surveillance.  The privacy policy changed in reaction to 
public opinion before anyone could attempt to look to the courts for 
clarity on the kiosks’ data collection.  The courts, however, are not 
necessarily able to provide clear guidance as they grapple with ever-
changing new technology.  Indeed, the kiosks themselves combine 
several types of data collection that are each subject to different lines 
of Fourth Amendment cases, including real-time location tracking, 
historical location data, and (potentially) facial recognition 
technology. 
New York City, however, does not need to wait for the courts to 
find a way through the judicial morass and respond to New Yorkers’ 
privacy concerns.  The city can use the power it wields over digital 
service providers through procurement and franchise decisions to 
enhance New Yorkers’ digital privacy and curtail the specter of mass 
surveillance systems.  As city officials express growing concern about 
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both privacy and closing the digital divide, the LinkNYC experience 
shows how they can better achieve those goals by requiring that 
franchisees like LinkNYC reveal more about what data privacy New 
Yorkers are sacrificing in exchange for the benefits of ubiquitous  
Wi-Fi and other smart city initiatives. 
Part I of this Note explores the digital divide, the smart cities 
movement, how the LinkNYC kiosks fit in both concepts, and the 
changes that have occurred to the LinkNYC privacy policy.  Part II 
discusses the Fourth Amendment applications to the new location-
tracking technologies that make up, or could make up, the LinkNYC 
kiosks, including real-time location tracking, historical location 
tracking, and facial recognition technology.  Part III proposes that the 
city take the changes it made to the LinkNYC privacy policy even 
further: require vendors to be more transparent about the data 
collected by smart city initiatives like LinkNYC and face 
consequences if promises are broken.  Such an approach will better-
inform New Yorkers about the data collected about them, will allow 
for a clearer judicial response if that collection goes too far, and is a 
practice that technology companies themselves have already adopted. 
I.  LINKNYC: NARROWING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE WHILE WIDENING 
DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE CONCERNS 
New York City launched LinkNYC to do two things 
simultaneously: make the city more equitable by providing internet 
access to more New Yorkers and “smarter” with innovative 
technology polices.  But the initial roll out of the kiosks’ privacy 
policy revealed that the New Yorkers most in need of greater internet 
access could be paying for it with citywide surveillance of their 
movements.  The subsequent changes to the privacy policy revealed, 
however, that it may be possible to make the city smarter without 
sacrificing New Yorkers’ privacy. 
A. Closing New York City’s Digital Divide as Mobile Broadband 
Usage Increases 
The “digital divide” refers to “the economic, educational, and 
social inequalities between those who have computers and online 
access and those who do not.”1  The divide can be one of access to 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Digital Divide, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/digital%20divide [https://perma.cc/WYJ5-QEDE]; see ORG. FOR ECON. 
CO-OPERATION & DEV., UNDERSTANDING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE 5 (2001), 
https://www.oecd.org/sti/1888451.pdf [https://perma.cc/23GH-RMMT]; see also 
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technology, people’s comfort with new technology,2 or socioeconomic 
factors that affect whether people will have access to and use modern 
technology such as computers, smartphones, and the internet.3  
Nationwide, nearly all young, affluent, and educated people have 
internet access.4  But people who are older, less educated, and less 
affluent are less likely to use computers and less likely to have access 
to the internet.5 
The digital divide is not just about technology and internet access; 
the quality and speed of the internet access that is available also play 
a role in the divide.6  Internet users increasingly use services that 
consume more data and require more bandwidth, and yet there are 
fewer high-bandwidth providers than there are low-bandwidth 
providers.7  Such fast, high-bandwidth internet is known as 
“broadband.”8  Increasingly, the digital divide is discussed not just as 
the gap between those who have internet access and those who do 
not, but also as the gap between those who have access to broadband 
and those who do not.9  How fast an internet connection must be to 
                                                                                                                 
OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, INTERNET INEQUALITY: BROADBAND ACCESS 
IN NYC 1 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 COMPTROLLER REPORT], 
http://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/Internet_Inequality_
UPDATE_September_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4R3-M6B8]. 
 2. JOHN B. HORRIGAN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., DIGITAL READINESS GAPS 2 
(2016), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2016/09/PI_2016.09.
20_Digital-Readiness-Gaps_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9B9-W6LV]. 
 3. ANDREW PERRIN & MAEVE DUGGAN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICANS’ 
INTERNET ACCESS: 2000–2015, at 6 (2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/
files/2015/06/2015-06-26_internet-usage-across-demographics-discover_FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CL2Q-6UFM]. 
 4. HORRIGAN, supra note 2, at 11; Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/internet-
broadband/ [https://perma.cc/2BLB-89Q5]. 
 5. HORRIGAN, supra note 2, at 13. 
 6. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS ISSUE BRIEF, MAPPING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE 6 
(2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/wh_digital_divide_
issue_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/66PL-AQPS]. 
 7. DAVID N. BEEDE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, COMPETITION AMONG U.S. 
BROADBAND SERVICE PROVIDERS, OCE ISSUE BRIEF # 01-14, at 2 (2014), 
http://esa.doc.gov/sites/default/files/competition-among-us-broadband-service-
providers.pdf [https://perma.cc/YLS5-WQ6T]. 
 8. Getting Broadband, FED. COMM. COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/
guides/getting-broadband [https://perma.cc/SAG9-HHZC]. 
 9. See LENNARD G. KRUGER & ANGELE A. GILROY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL30719, BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS AND THE DIGITAL DIVIDE: FEDERAL 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 1 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30719.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9JJA-HUG7]; see also KATHERINE BATES ET AL., ICF INT’L, 
CLOSING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE: PROMOTING BROADBAND ADOPTION AMONG 
UNDERSERVED POPULATIONS 1 (2012), http://www.nlc.org/sites/default/files/Closing_
Digital_Divide_Promoting_Broadband_Adoption_Underserved_Populations.pdf 
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qualify as broadband varies, but the Federal Communications 
Commission (“FCC”) has set a benchmark of 25 megabits per second 
(“Mbps”) for downloads and 3 Mbps for uploads for fixed broadband 
services.10  The FCC has not set a benchmark for how fast a 
connection has to be on mobile devices like smartphones to qualify as 
broadband.11  In New York State, a grant program designed to 
increase broadband deployment throughout the state has set “a goal 
of 100 Mbps download speeds, with 25 Mbps acceptable in the most 
remote and rural areas.”12 
Efforts to increase broadband usage are slowed largely by two cost-
based factors: broadband availability and broadband adoption.13  
First, broadband providers are reluctant to invest in broadband 
infrastructure in less-populated areas where their return on 
investment is lower because they must install more equipment to 
connect fewer people than in densely-populated areas.14  This 
presence, or not, of broadband service to users in a particular area is 
                                                                                                                 
[https://perma.cc/M3CB-K3PZ]; James E. Prieger, The Broadband Digital Divide 
and the Economic Benefits of Mobile Broadband for Rural Areas, 37 TELECOMMS. 
POL’Y 483, 483 (2013); COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 6, at 6. 
 10. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, FCC 17-109, THIRTEENTH SECTION 706 REPORT 
NOTICE OF INQUIRY 5 (2017) https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/0808160504329/FCC-17-
109A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/BQ94-82KV]. 
 11. Id. at 7. 
 12. Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor Cuomo Launches 
Third Round of New NY Broadband Program (Mar. 30, 2017), 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-launches-third-round-new-ny-
broadband-program [https://perma.cc/G7UP-YNNK].  Prior to the launch of the 
program in 2017, the State had set a minimum speed of 6 Mbps download and 1.5 
Mbps upload. Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, 2015 Opportunity 
Agenda: Restoring Economic Opportunity (Jan. 16, 2015), 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/2015-opportunity-agenda-restoring-economic-
opportunity-1 [https://perma.cc/3Y6T-X6X2]. 
 13. KRUGER & GILROY, supra note 9, at 5; FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, FCC 16-6, 
2016 BROADBAND PROGRESS REPORT 44–45 (2016), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
attachmatch/FCC-16-6A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/KY9M-RCWH]. But see U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-473, BROADBAND: INTENDED OUTCOMES AND 
EFFECTIVENESS OF EFFORTS TO ADDRESS ADOPTION BARRIERS ARE UNCLEAR 11–12 
(2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/670588.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8UX-REEB] 
(discussing other reasons people do not have or use broadband). 
 14. Mike Orcutt, The Next President Will Inherit America’s Embarrassing Digital 
Divide, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/
602393/the-next-president-will-inherit-americas-embarrassing-digital-divide/ 
[https://perma.cc/366J-3Z9L] (“Broadband providers get far more bang for their 
infrastructure buck by building in cities, where a new bit of fiber, say, will reach far 
more potential customers than it would out in the sticks.”). 
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known as broadband availability.15  Second, the high cost of internet 
plans makes people with limited income less likely to pay for access.16  
This is broadband adoption.17  The cost of internet subscriptions for 
consumers is much higher in the United States than in other 
industrialized countries.18  These dual costs of deploying 
infrastructure and of paying for use make the digital divide most 
persistent in poor rural and urban areas.19  Even if broadband is 
available in a particular area, the costs to users can slow adoption of 
broadband in that area.20  Those gaps can vary in different areas 
across the country.21  In addition, the divide can be exacerbated by a 
lack of digital literacy, limited access to technology, and users’ 
perception that broadband access would not be beneficial to them.22 
But the digital divide is not a mere annoyance; its pernicious effects 
can include a lower likelihood of school enrollment in households 
that do not have access to a home computer,23 difficulty in finding 
employment,24 and lower economic growth and quality of life.25  Even 
                                                                                                                 
 15. KRUGER & GILROY, supra note 9, at 2 (noting that “[m]easurements of 
broadband availability depend on how broadband service is defined in terms of what 
download and upload speeds it offers[]”). 
 16. JOHN B. HORRIGAN & MAEVE DUGGAN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., HOME 
BROADBAND 2015, at 15 (2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/12/Broadband-
adoption-full.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NWJ-8KF7]. 
 17. KRUGER & GILROY, supra note 9, at 5. 
 18. Orcutt, supra note 14. 
 19. See David Talbot, The Unacceptable Persistence of the Digital Divide, MIT 
TECH. REV. (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603083/ 
the-unacceptable-persistence-of-the-digital-divide/ [https://perma.cc/D86T-C7XG] 
(“[T]he United States lags far behind much of the industrialized world in available 
broadband speeds and affordability of fast services—a problem that is particularly 
acute in inner cities and rural areas.”). 
 20. KRUGER & GILROY, supra note 9, at 5. 
 21. Mike Maciag, Digital Divide Most Glaring in Low-Income Communities, 
GOV’T TECH. (Sept. 7, 2017), http://www.govtech.com/computing/Where-the-Digital-
Divide-Is-the-Worst.html [https://perma.cc/Y2QT-9LPY]. 
 22. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 11–12; COUNCIL OF 
ECON. ADVISERS, ISSUE BRIEF, THE DIGITAL DIVIDE AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF 
BROADBAND ACCESS 9 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/
files/page/files/20160308_broadband_cea_issue_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/73TC-
PTLB]. 
 23. Robert W. Fairlie, The Effects of Home Computers on School Enrollment, 
24 ECON. EDUC. REV. 533, 536–39 (Oct. 2005). 
 24. Golda Arthur, Lack of Internet Access Makes Climb out of Poverty Harder, 
AL JAZEERA AM. (Oct. 24, 2015), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/
2015/10/24/not-having-internet-access-at-home-hinders-education-employment.html 
[https://perma.cc/6FEA-EX4F]. 
 25. WORLD ECON. FORUM, INTERNET FOR ALL: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
ACCELERATING INTERNET ACCESS AND ADOPTION 8 (2016), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Internet_for_All_Framework_Accelerating_Inte
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in urban environments such as Detroit, the digital divide between 
more and less affluent neighborhoods might also have stifled the 
city’s growth by making it harder for unemployed people to find 
jobs.26 
In New York City, the digital divide is deeper along socioeconomic 
and neighborhood lines—and is growing.27  The higher cost of 
internet access in New York compared to other cities contributes to 
the digital divide.28  In 2014, 16% of New York City households did 
not have computers.29  According to 2016 U.S. Census Bureau figures, 
about 10.7% of households nationwide did not have a computer 
(which includes handheld computers like smartphones), and about 
18.1% did not have a broadband subscription.30  By 2016, in New 
York City, about 12% of households did not have computers and 
about 19.7% had no broadband subscription.31  Even though those 
figures have improved, they hide big disparities among boroughs.32  In 
Manhattan (New York County), about 9.4% of households did not 
have computers in 2016 and about 16.3% had no broadband 
                                                                                                                 
rnet_Access_Adoption_report_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XFC-CE54]. See generally 
Brian Whitacre et al., Broadband’s Contribution to Economic Growth in Rural 
Areas: Moving Towards a Causal Relationship, 38 TELECOMM. POL’Y 1011 (2014). 
 26. Cecilia Kang, Unemployed Detroit Residents Are Trapped by a Digital 
Divide, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/23/technology/
unemployed-detroit-residents-are-trapped-by-a-digital-divide.html [https://nyti.ms/
2jEuYPT]. 
 27. 2015 COMPTROLLER REPORT, supra note 1, at 1 (comparing U.S. Census 
Bureau data from 2013 and 2014 reports). 
 28. OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, INTERNET INEQUALITY: BROADBAND 
ACCESS IN NYC 2–3 (Dec. 2014), https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/
documents/Internet_Inequality.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5ST-K8QV]. 
 29. 2015 COMPTROLLER REPORT, supra note 1, at 4. 
 30. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TYPES OF COMPUTERS AND INTERNET SUBSCRIPTIONS, 
S2801, 2016 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 1-YEAR ESTIMATES (2017), 
https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/16_1YR/S2801 [https://perma.cc/
Q62Q-5U3V]; see also CAMILLE RYAN & JAMIE M. LEWIS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
ACS-37, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2015, at 3–6 (2017), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/acs/acs-37.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GVW5-U65W] (analyzing 2015 data). 
 31. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TYPES OF COMPUTERS AND INTERNET SUBSCRIPTIONS, 
supra note 30 (data sorted for New York City). 
 32. See Press Release, N.Y.C. Public Advocate Letitia James & Council Member 
Ben Kallos, New York City Digital Divide Fact Sheet (Mar. 16, 2017), 
https://benkallos.com/sites/default/files/PressRelease_Spectrum_Internet_Assist_Fact
_Sheet_20170316.pdf [https://perma.cc/ESG6-3RR9] (analyzing 2015 data); Jakob 
Winkler, Mapping New York City’s Digital Divide, NEW SCH. (Spring 2017), 
https://gpia-gis.github.io/adv-spring2017/projects/mapping-new-york-city-s-digital-
divide-/ [https://perma.cc/CK5C-YP7V] (displaying geographic differences in access 
to infrastructure necessary for broadband). 
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subscription.33  But during the same period in the Bronx (Bronx 
County), about 14.8% of households did not have computers and 
about 26.2% had no broadband subscription.34  From 2013 to 2014, 
data suggest that the percentage of households that lacked broadband 
actually increased in the South Bronx and Central and Eastern 
Brooklyn neighborhoods.35  Other studies suggest that adoption of 
home broadband nationwide has plateaued in recent years.36 
As home broadband adoption has stagnated, there has been an 
increase in those who use a smartphone to connect to the internet.37  
The Pew Research Center estimates that, nationwide, “smartphone-
only” users increased from 8% in 2013 to 13% in 2015.38  Younger, 
lower-income, and minority households are more likely to be 
smartphone-only.39  Among those whose household income was less 
than $30,000 in 2016, 20% were smartphone-only users.40 
Some researchers say that the increasing reliance on mobile devices 
could help close the digital divide.41  The increasing use of mobile 
broadband has led the FCC, which has a statutory mandate to 
evaluate “whether advanced telecommunications capability is being 
deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion,”42 to 
consider changing how it measures that deployment to include mobile 
broadband.43  But other researchers say that smartphone-only access 
                                                                                                                 
 33. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TYPES OF COMPUTERS AND INTERNET SUBSCRIPTIONS, 
supra note 30 (data broken down by borough). 
 34. Id. 
 35. 2015 COMPTROLLER REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. 
 36. HORRIGAN & DUGGAN, supra note 16, at 2. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id at 9–10. 
 40. See Monica Anderson, Digital Divide Persists Even as Lower-Income 
Americans Make Gains in Tech Adoption, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 22, 2017), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/22/digital-divide-persists-even-as-
lower-income-americans-make-gains-in-tech-adoption/ [https://perma.cc/P9QN-
NZTL]. 
 41. Jamie M. Lewis, Handheld Device Ownership: Reducing the Digital Divide? 2 
(U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper No. SEHSD 2017-04), 
https://census.gov/library/working-papers/2017/demo/SEHSD-WP2017-04.html 
[https://perma.cc/S2KA-MLBC]. 
 42. 47 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (2012). 
 43. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 10, at 5. But see id. at 20 (concurring 
statement of Commissioner Mignon L. Clyburn) (“Consumers who are mobile only 
often find themselves in such a position, not by choice but because they cannot afford 
a fixed connection.  Today, mobile and fixed broadband are complements, not 
substitutes.”). 
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is not a complete salve for the digital divide.44  Smartphone-only users 
face financial difficulties such as limits on the amount of data they can 
use, difficulty in finding and applying for jobs online, and little 
opportunity to develop digital skills necessary for jobs that require 
familiarity with computer use.45  Smartphone-only students also face 
additional challenges if their schools require projects to be completed 
online that are difficult to do on a smartphone.46 
A variety of methods to close the digital divide have been rolled 
out or suggested.  Possibilities include beaming wireless signals from 
hot air balloons, tapping unused television signals to reach remote 
areas,47 launching municipal broadband networks,48 and transmitting 
Wi-Fi from cellular phone towers.49  In 2015, New York State 
announced a $500 million infrastructure grant program to encourage 
broadband investments in rural areas of the state.50  The State wants 
to make broadband more widely available in areas where wireline 
providers51 only offer internet speeds of less than 100 Mbps.52  The 
goal is to make broadband available in the entire state by the end of 
                                                                                                                 
 44. See generally Monica Anderson & John B. Horrigan, Smartphones Help 
Those Without Broadband Get Online, but Don’t Necessarily Bridge the Digital 
Divide, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/10/03/smartphones-help-those-without-broadband-get-online-but-dont-
necessarily-bridge-the-digital-divide/ [https://perma.cc/D8K2-AGHJ]. 
 45. HORRIGAN & DUGGAN, supra note 16, at 3; see also Talbot, supra note 19 
(“People without broadband are not necessarily entirely offline . . . some of them rely 
on smartphones.  But because of small screens and data caps, phones are not an 
adequate substitute for home broadband.”). 
 46. Talbot, supra note 19; Rick Karr, New York City’s Plan to Bridge the Digital 
Divide with WiFi, THIRTEEN (June 11, 2014), http://www.thirteen.org/metrofocus/
2014/06/new-york-citys-plan-to-bridge-the-digital-divide-with-wifi/ [https://perma.cc/
B6PY-KUH2] (“[Y]ou’re not going to see kids writing term papers on mobile 
devices, said [Christopher] Mitchell [the director of Community Broadband 
Networks Initiative in Minneapolis].”). 
 47. Cecilia Kang, To Close Digital Divide, Microsoft to Harness Unused 
Television Channels, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/07/11/technology/to-close-digital-divide-microsoft-to-harness-unused-television-
channels.html [https://nyti.ms/2v65FIO]. 
 48. Olivier Sylvain, Broadband Localism, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 795, 836–37 (2012). 
 49. David Sommerstein, Mohawks Provide High Speed Internet to Lewis County, 
Clinton County Next, N. COUNTRY PUB. RADIO (Mar. 20, 2017), 
https://www.northcountrypublicradio.org/news/story/33573/20170320/mohawks-
provide-high-speed-internet-to-lewis-county-clinton-county-next [https://perma.cc/
VQA4-8KDL]. 
 50. Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, supra note 12. 
 51. Wireline providers deliver broadband service through physical wires such as 
fiber, coaxial cables, or copper telephone lines. See “What Is Broadband?”, N.Y. 
STATE BROADBAND PROGRAM OFFICE, https://nysbroadband.ny.gov/broadband-
overview [https://perma.cc/8VYT-27P7]. 
 52. Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, supra note 12. 
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2018.53  The plan requires winners of the grants to make some 
subscriptions available for less than $60 per month.54  But critics say 
this price is not affordable enough to address the often prohibitively 
high cost of internet access for users even in places where it is 
available.55 
In New York City, there are a variety of efforts to increase access 
to broadband and narrow the digital divide.56  Former Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg spearheaded Wi-Fi initiatives,57 and Mayor Bill de 
Blasio’s administration has also touted its efforts to close the digital 
divide.58  For example, the New York Public Housing Authority has 
“digital vans” with computer workstations and instructors that travel 
to public housing projects.59  Some of the city’s parks have free Wi-Fi 
provided by AT&T.60  The Harlem neighborhood in Manhattan is 
home to a ninety-five-square-block Wi-Fi zone the city launched with 
                                                                                                                 
 53. See Joseph Spector, NY Plans Broadband Expansion, POUGHKEEPSIE J. 
(Aug. 3, 2016), http://www.app.com/story/news/local/new-york/2016/08/03/ny-plans-
broadband-expansion/88008550/ [https://perma.cc/FJV3-C2BC]. 
 54. JEFFREY NORDHAUS, N.Y. STATE BROADBAND PROGRAM OFFICE, NEW NY 
BROADBAND PROGRAM PHASE 3 BIDDERS CONFERENCE 14, 29 (2017), 
https://nysbroadband.ny.gov/sites/default/files/finall_introducing_phase_3.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8CNF-YQUZ].  These plans can be slower; the minimum 
requirement is 25 Mbps for downloads and 4 Mbps for uploads. Id. 
 55. See Michael Reilly, Could New York’s Plan to Erase Its Digital Divide Work 
for America?, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/
s/603939/could-new-yorks-plan-to-erase-its-digital-divide-work-for-america/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q9VR-AFFH]; see also Susan Crawford, New York’s Dream of a 
High Speed Internet Empire, WIRED (June 4, 2015), https://www.wired.com/
2015/06/new-yorks-dream-of-a-high-speed-internet-empire/ [https://perma.cc/26JR-
GKQ3] (“Affordability is a major barrier in New York State, as it is across the 
country.”). 
 56. Broadband Access, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF INFO. TECH. & TELECOMMS., 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doitt/initiatives/broadband-access.page [https://perma.cc/
U2TD-5PES]. 
 57. Tessa Stuart, Free Wi-Fi Coming to Brownsville, Harlem, the Bronx, and 
Housing Projects in Brooklyn, VILLAGE VOICE (Oct. 1, 2013), 
https://www.villagevoice.com/2013/10/01/free-wi-fi-coming-to-brownsville-harlem-
the-bronx-and-housing-projects-in-brooklyn/ [https://perma.cc/8ENF-VJDZ]. 
 58. Maya Wiley, Broadband City: How New York Is Bridging Its Digital Divide, 
THE NATION (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/broadband-city-how-
new-york-is-bridging-its-digital-divide/ [https://perma.cc/N3U4-QYZD]; Press 
Release, City of New York, De Blasio Administration Escalates Efforts to Close 
Digital Divide and Drive Down Cost of Internet for New Yorkers (Apr. 9, 2015), 
http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/226-15/de-blasio-administration-
escalates-efforts-close-digital-divide-drive-down-cost-internet [https://perma.cc/CSS8-
Q4N9]. 
 59. Digital Vans, N.Y.C. HOUS. AUTH., http://www1.nyc.gov/site/nycha/residents/
digital-van.page [https://perma.cc/W53X-SGRW]. 
 60. Wi-Fi in Parks, N.Y.C. PARKS, https://www.nycgovparks.org/facilities/wifi 
[https://perma.cc/KH38-R4TC]. 
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the help of a private foundation and a technology company.61  Other 
city-backed programs aim to bring Wi-Fi and broadband internet 
directly into housing projects.62  Some organizations, such as the New 
York Public Library and the Brooklyn Public Library, have also 
launched their own initiatives, lending out free Wi-Fi hotspots to 
public school children who do not have internet access at home.63 
B. The Smart Cities Movement and Digital Inequality 
On the flipside of the urban digital divide is the “smart cities” 
movement.  A “smart city” is loosely defined as one that uses 
technology and the internet as tools to solve all sorts of urban ills.64  
For example, smart city projects include harnessing the “Internet of 
Things” to make a city run better,65 such as using cameras and sensors 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Press Release, City of New York, Mayor Bloomberg Announces Country’s 
Largest Continuous Free Public WiFi Network (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www1.nyc.gov/
office-of-the-mayor/news/394-13/mayor-bloomberg-country-s-largest-continuous-
free-public-wifi-network [https://perma.cc/H5SU-NH7G]; see also Free Harlem WiFi, 
MAYOR’S FUND TO ADVANCE N.Y.C., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/fund/initiatives/free-
harlem-wifi.page [https://perma.cc/C32N-R8RU]. 
 62. Gideon Lewis-Kraus, Inside the Battle to Bring Broadband to New York’s 
Public Housing, WIRED (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/11/bringing-
internet-to-new-york-public-housing/ [https://perma.cc/7SQD-M8A6]; Press Release, 
City of New York, Mayor de Blasio, HUD Secretary Castro, and T-Mobile 
Announce 5,000 Families in Bronx Public Housing to Receive Free Tablets and 
Mobile Internet Service (Dec. 16, 2016), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-
mayor/news/956-16/mayor-de-blasio-hud-secretary-castro-t-mobile-5-000-families-
bronx-public-housing#/0 [https://perma.cc/UFS9-RNPN]; Press Release, City of New 
York, Mayor de Blasio Announces up to $10 Million Investment in Free Broadband 
Service for Five NYCHA Developments (July 16, 2015), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-
of-the-mayor/news/491-15/mayor-de-blasio-up-10-million-investment-free-
broadband-service-five-nycha#/0 [https://perma.cc/4VTQ-8S35]. 
 63. Keldy Oritz & Ginger Adams Otis, New York Public Library Expands Wi-Fi 
Lending, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/
new-york-public-library-expands-wi-fi-lending-article-1.2196477 [https://perma.cc/
NWQ7-63LF]; Library HotSpot Loan Program, BROOKLYN PUB. LIBR., 
https://www.bklynlibrary.org/hotspot [https://perma.cc/YC5B-T9XK]; Library 
HotSpot, N.Y. PUB. LIBR., http://hotspot.nypl.org/ [https://perma.cc/S4JL-C89X]. 
 64. Kelsey Finch & Omer Tene, Welcome to the Metropticon: Protecting Privacy 
in a Hyperconnected Town, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1581, 1583–84 (2014). But see, 
e.g., Albert Meijer & Manuel Pedro Rodrígues Bolívar, Governing the Smart City: A 
Review of the Literature on Smart Urban Governance, 82 INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 
392, 394 (2016) (discussing the “fuzzy concept” of the “smart city” and the various 
ways it can be defined); Vito Albino, Umberto Berardi & Rosa Maria Dangelico, 
Smart Cities: Definitions, Dimensions, and Performance, 22 J. URB. TECH. 1, 2, 4 
(2013) (same). 
 65. Devices that connect objects to the internet or other networks are broadly 
referred to as the “Internet of Things” (“IoT”). U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-17-570, INTERNET OF THINGS: COMMUNITIES DEPLOY PROJECTS BY 
COMBINING FEDERAL SUPPORT WITH OTHER FUNDS AND EXPERTISE 4–5 (2017), 
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on street lights to monitor and adjust red lights to ease traffic flows,66 
and installing “smart grids” that can use similar devices deployed 
throughout a given area to improve the efficiency and resiliency of 
the electric grid.67  New York City has been particularly aggressive in 
converting itself into a smart city that uses sensors and other 
technology to better manage and understand urban life, including 
817,000 wireless water meters to monitor water use and sensors on 
700 solar-powered trash cans that can alert sanitation workers when 
the cans are full.68 
“Open data” is another common smart city initiative.69  Typically, 
open data refers to websites where a government posts some or all of 
the vast troves of data that it collects in a machine-readable format.70  
The goal of open data is to promote government transparency and to 
allow others to deploy government data in useful ways.71  Initiatives 
like the Freedom of Information Act and some of the open data 
policies of the Obama administration tend to focus on transparency, 
while municipal open data initiatives tend to focus on using the data 
to improve city services.72  For example, providing campaign finance 
information is meant to promote public accountability and 
transparency, while making bus schedule data available and machine-
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Advance Smart Transportation Initiatives (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.denvergov.org/
content/denvergov/en/transportation-mobility/smart-city.html [https://perma.cc/ET
U5-TRU6]. 
 67. See Rosaldo J. F. Rossetti, Smart Grids, 1 READINGS ON SMART CITIES, no. 10, 
Nov. 2015, https://smartcities.ieee.org/articles-publications/ieee-xplore-readings-on-
smart-cities/november-2015.html [https://perma.cc/Q7U2-TL3D]. 
 68. Robert Lee Hotz, As World Crowds In, Cities Become Digital Laboratories, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2015, 11:10AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-world-crowds-
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(“Hundreds of aging cities have embraced digital technology, but few are moving as 
quickly as New York to link municipal computer networks, develop novel 
applications, make digital data public or install so many thousands of sensors to 
monitor urban life—from water quality, traffic and power use, to the sound of 
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 69. See generally Rosaldo J. F. Rossetti, Smartly Opening Up City Data, 
1 READINGS ON SMART CITIES, no. 4, Apr./May 2015, https://smartcities.ieee.org/
articles-publications/ieee-xplore-readings-on-smart-cities/april-2015.html 
[https://perma.cc/DHW3-CD7D]. 
 70. Harlan Yu & David G. Robinson, The New Ambiguity of “Open 
Government,” 59 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 178, 191–92 (2012). 
 71. Id. at 192. 
 72. Id. at 196–99. 
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readable is meant to allow developers to launch apps and other tools 
that enhance bus riders’ experiences.73  Of course, transparency is not 
a solution by itself.74  Open data can be misused or expose people to 
other risks, such as using data to target vulnerable communities, using 
someone’s data without their consent, compromising individual 
privacy, re-engineering ostensibly anonymous data to identify specific 
individuals, inadvertently disclosing data, and breaching or 
compromising data security, among others.75 
New York City’s open data disclosures are some of the most 
extensive in the world.76  New York City has published some public 
data online since at least 1993.77  In 2012, the city’s open data law 
came into force, requiring all city agencies to publish public data they 
collect on a new web portal in a machine-readable format.78  The law 
notes that the open data portal would make the city “more 
transparent, effective and accountable to the public.”79  About 1700 
different public data sets are now available through the portal.80  The 
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ADDRESSING PRIVACY, SECURITY, & CIVIL RIGHTS CHALLENGES (2015), 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Final_OpenDataLit
Review_2015-04-14_1.1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VWQ4-5ZY3] (surveying articles on 
open data as background materials for those attending annual symposium). 
 76. Hotz, supra note 68 (“New York has made more of its own data public than 
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TECH. (Mar. 10, 2017), http://www.govtech.com/data/New-York-City-Open-Data-A-
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 78. See 2012 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 11 (codified as amended at N.Y.C. ADMIN. 
CODE §§ 23-501 to 23-503 (2018)).  Not all data can be released. See, e.g., CITY OF 
NEW YORK, DEP’T OF INFO. TECH. & TELECOMM., OPEN DATA FOR ALL 2017 
PROGRESS REPORT 46 (2017), https://opendata.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/
2017/07/OD4A-report_2017-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/GP46-N6GZ] (noting that legal 
counsel has advices that live birth data cannot be released through the portal). 
 79. 2012 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 11 (codified as amended at N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE 
§§ 23-501 to 23-503 (2018)).  
 80. See OPEN DATA FOR ALL 2017 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 78, at 6.  
“‘Public data set’ means a comprehensive collection of interrelated data that is 
available for inspection by the public in accordance with any provision of law and is 
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portal’s data sets show such varied information as neighborhood 
crime statistics, the species of every tree along New York City 
sidewalks,81 and even rat sightings based on 311 calls.82 
Smart city initiatives have also been seen as ways to address public 
safety.83  The New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) has 
touted various initiatives to use technology to fight crime.84  For 
example, the NYPD releases crime statistics online in a variety of 
formats.85  In addition, the city has deployed special sensors that 
detect gunshots and help deploy police to the scene quickly.86 
But smart city projects also raise security and privacy concerns.87  
Such networks can be hard to secure from cyberattacks.88  Vast 
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Finest Keep NYC Safe (Feb. 20, 2017), http://nypdnews.com/2017/02/nypd-
technology-helping-the-finest-keep-nyc-safe/ [https://perma.cc/76PK-NHKN]. 
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About All Major New York City Crimes, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 30, 2015, 4:16 
PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd-releases-online-crime-database-
public-article-1.2481185 [https://perma.cc/3ZAT-J77N]. 
 86. See Tatiana Schlossberg, New York Police Begin Using ShotSpotter System 
to Detect Gunshots, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/
03/17/nyregion/shotspotter-detection-system-pinpoints-gunshot-locations-and-sends-
data-to-the-police.html [https://nyti.ms/2mdl3m7]; Press Release, City of New York, 
Fact Sheet: Mayor de Blasio Releases Preliminary Budget for Fiscal Year 2017 (Jan. 
21, 2016), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/077-16/fact-sheet-mayor-de-
blasio-releases-preliminary-budget-fiscal-year-2017 [https://perma.cc/F7CY-T3CD]. 
 87. See, e.g., Finch & Tene, supra note 64, at 1605; Chris Mellor, Smart Cities? 
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municipal wireless networks are tempting targets for hackers.89  Smart 
city projects can also be used as mass surveillance systems: for 
example, gunshot sensors may eavesdrop on nearby pedestrians’ 
private conversations.90  Privacy groups and others have also raised 
concerns regarding the vast amounts of data about law-abiding 
citizens that are collected and stored, perhaps indefinitely, by the 
NYPD,91 the lack of transparency about software used in “predictive 
policing” programs,92 and the ability of smart city technology to track 
an individual’s movements and life.93 
Perhaps one of the most controversial such programs is the 
NYPD’s Domain Awareness System, which uses cameras and sensors, 
combined with data, to quickly identify threats.94  As of 2015, the 
system consisted of 10,000 public and private security cameras, 1000 
license plate readers, and 600 radiation and chemical sensors 
throughout Manhattan.95  The city developed the system with 
Microsoft Corp. and shares the revenue when it is sold to other 
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computing [https://perma.cc/9447-FGPK]. 
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Fast Hot Spots, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 19, 2016, 2:43 PM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/
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security professional at Immunity Inc., who gets paid to find vulnerabilities in high-
value networks.  ‘An attack is inevitable on New York City’s system,’ he says. ‘It is 
too big of a trophy.’”). 
 90. See Jay Stanley, Shotspotter CEO Answers Questions on Gunshot Detectors 
in Cities, ACLU: BLOG (May 5, 2015, 9:15 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-
technology/surveillance-technologies/shotspotter-ceo-answers-questions-gunshot 
[https://perma.cc/B32D-K32A]. 
 91. See N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BEYOND “DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE”: AN 
NYPD FOR ALL NEW YORKERS 28 (2013), https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/
publications/nypd_report_final_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SGL-368F]. 
 92. See Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Testimony on Int. 1696, Relating to the 
Disclosure of Source Code by Agencies Engaged in Policing and Other Services, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/
testimony-int-1696-relating-disclosure-source-code-agencies-engaged-policing-and-
other# [https://perma.cc/8HL6-87AM]. 
 93. See Steven Poole, The Truth About Smart Cities: “In the End, They Will 
Destroy Democracy,” THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/
cities/2014/dec/17/truth-smart-city-destroy-democracy-urban-thinkers-buzzphrase 
[https://perma.cc/9PE3-Y77J]. 
 94. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth 
Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 48–50 (2014); see also N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, THE 
POLICE COMMISSIONER’S REPORT 72 (2017), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/
downloads/pdf/publications/pc-report-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5PU-NGRB]. 
 95. Hotz, supra note 68. 
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cities.96  To supporters of the system, the Domain Awareness System 
is a cost-effective way to combine technology and data to thwart 
terrorism.97  To skeptics, it is a vast state-sponsored spy network that 
is now being expanded to cities beyond New York.98 
Despite the concerns, government officials continue to advance 
such smart city initiatives.  The federal government has funded some 
of these programs in more than seventy local communities.99  The 
National Institute of Standards and Technology is also developing a 
framework to make smart city technologies standardized and 
interoperable.100  States have pushed their own open data policies.101  
The U.S. Department of Transportation sponsored a contest to spur 
local smart city initiatives.102  Local officials and industry 
representatives have touted their own smart city initiatives, especially 
those that expand internet access to underserved communities, as 
tools that cities can use to bridge the digital divide.103  New York City 
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has said that closing the digital divide “is central to the City’s strategy 
for technology and innovation.”104 
C. LinkNYC Privacy Policy Changed After Public Outcry 
Of all the proposals in New York City to close the digital divide 
and make New York “smarter,” perhaps no other is as ambitious in 
scope—and troublesome to privacy advocates—as transforming the 
city’s once-ubiquitous payphones into a citywide Wi-Fi network.105  
As New Yorkers largely abandoned the payphones in favor of smart 
phones, payphone usage dropped dramatically, and many payphones 
were valuable solely for their advertising space.106  In 2012, the city 
began exploring options to replace the payphones, which were 
operated by private companies that had received franchises from the 
city.107  The city began adding Wi-Fi to some existing payphones,108 
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blazing-fast-but-at-what-cost-to-privacy [https://perma.cc/7AC7-4U3U]; Sam Gustin, 
Amid Privacy Concerns, NYC Approves Bid to Turn Payphones into Wifi Hotspots, 
MOTHERBOARD (Nov. 18, 2014, 6:00 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/
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hotspots [https://perma.cc/5NF2-2CDU]; Kyle VanHemert, NYC’s New Pay Phones 
Will Provide Super-Fast Wi-Fi—and Super-Smart Ads, WIRED (Nov. 19, 2014, 
4:24 PM), https://www.wired.com/2014/11/new-york-linknyc-free-internet/ 
[https://perma.cc/S3RX-V2QV]. 
 106. See N.Y.C. Council, Comm. Rep., Oversight Hearing on the Dep’t of Info. 
Tech. and Telecomm. Request for Proposals Concerning NYC WiFi and Information 
Hubs 4 (June 18, 2014) [hereinafter June 2014 Hearing Report], 
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SN5W]. 
 107. Id. 
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and in 2013, it received more than 125 submissions for a payphone 
redesign competition.109 
In May 2014, the city’s Department of Information Technology and 
Telecommunications (“DoITT”) put out a request for proposals 
(“RFP”) to radically alter the city’s payphones.110  The RFP said the 
city would give to a single bidder a contract, known as a franchise 
agreement, to install a citywide network of hotspots where the 
payphones had once been.111  Those structures would then provide 
free Wi-Fi to New Yorkers as they walked the city’s streets.112  The 
city also encouraged proposals that included environmental sensors, 
text messaging, and free phone calls.113  In exchange, the winning 
bidder would receive advertising revenue from advertisements placed 
on the structures.114  The winning bidder would receive a franchise 
from the city to place up to 10,000 of the structures on city sidewalks, 
replacing the 7300 payphones then installed there.115  The city 
required that bidders guarantee that at least $17 million116 of the 
                                                                                                                 
 108. See Press Release, City of New York Department of Technology and 
Telecommunications, Citywide Chief Information & Innovation Officer Merchant, 
Chief Digital Officer Sterne, Council Member Brewer, Van Wagner 
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Payphone Kiosks (July 11, 2012), https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doitt/about/pr-
120711.page [https://perma.cc/QY7J-7X6K]. 
 109. Reinvent Payphones Design Challenge, NYC DIGITAL, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20140823203527/nyc.gov/html/digital/html/opengov/reinv
entpayphones.shtml [https://perma.cc/8Y3Y-NQAW]; Pay Phones, CITY OF N.Y. 
DEP’T OF TECH. & TELECOMM., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doitt/residents/pay-
phones.page [https://perma.cc/E7PU-6WV7]. 
 110. See Press Release, City of New York, New York City Issues Request for 
Proposals to Build Citywide Wi-Fi Network and State-of-the-Art Information Hubs 
(May 1, 2014) [hereinafter Press Release, NYC Issues Request for Proposals], 
http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/193-14/new-york-city-issues-request-
proposals-build-citywide-wi-fi-network-state-of-the-art [https://perma.cc/DCT7-
5P5H]; see also June 2014 Hearing Report, supra note 106, at 1. 
 111. Press Release, NYC Issues Request for Proposals, supra note 110. 
 112. Id.  
 113. See Fact Sheet: Request for Proposals: NYC WiFi & Communication Hubs, 
CITY OF NEW YORK (Apr. 30, 2014), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/doitt/downloads/
pdf/Public-Comm-Structures-RFP-Fact-Sheet-04-30-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9AM-
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 116. The figure represented about what the city was then receiving in advertising 
revenues from existing payphones. See Jennifer Peltz, Can You Download Me Now? 
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advertising revenue be funneled back to the city every year for the 
length of the franchise agreement.117 
The RFP did not, however, say much about data privacy or 
security.  The RFP did not require bidders to describe how they 
would secure user data privacy, but did request that the bidders 
describe “how, and for what purposes, the data contained within the 
system will be utilized[.]”118  Digital data security concerns were not 
addressed by the RFP.119  Concerns raised at a city council 
subcommittee’s oversight hearing in May 2014 focused on the 
anticompetitive potential of awarding the franchise to a single 
bidder.120 
At least sixty organizations—including Google, Time Warner, 
Cisco, the Metropolitan Transit Authority, and Verizon—expressed 
interest in the RFP.121  At a May 2014 conference with the DoITT, 
potential bidders asked about data collection, using that data to 
generate revenue, and whether the Wi-Fi could be used for “data 
mining and push advertising”; the city said it would “consider” such 
proposals.122 
Ultimately, seven bidders submitted proposals123: a division of 
media and entertainment company Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.;124 
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 118. Id. at 11. 
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 121. Sam Gustin, Google May Turn 7,000 New York City Payphones into WiFi 
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hotspots [https://perma.cc/5HDN-DPAC]; see also City of N.Y. Dep’t of Info. Tech. 
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Q&A (May 12, 2014) [hereinafter RFP - Pre-proposal Conference Q&A], 
https://web.archive.org/web/20141005093717/http://www.nyc.gov/html/doitt/download
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 122. RFP - Pre-proposal Conference Q&A, supra note 121, at 4, 5. 
 123. Transcript of Public Hearing of the Franchise and Concession Review Comm. 
12 (Dec. 8, 2014) [hereinafter Transcript of Public Hearing of the Franchise and 
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(July 21, 2014) [hereinafter Clear Channel Bid] (on file with the author). 
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advertising company and payphone franchise holder Van Wagner;125 
LQD Wi-Fi NYC, LLC, a consortium of companies that included 
ones involved in the Harlem Wi-Fi project;126 the United States Post 
Office, which proposed an alternative that would incorporate both 
Wi-Fi and structures with lock boxes for New Yorkers to receive 
packages;127 Telebeam Telecommunications Corp., which held a 
payphone franchise;128 an individual; and CityBridge LLC,129 a 
consortium of companies that includes the previous owners of many 
of the city’s payphones,130 Qualcomm Inc., entities later controlled by 
Google parent Alphabet Inc., and others.131  Revenue estimates in the 
proposals varied.  Clear Channel said the city’s specifications were 
too vague to make an accurate revenue estimate132 and the Post 
Office did not make a revenue estimate.133  Van Wagner estimated 
about $300 million over the period of the franchise;134 LQD estimated 
$180 million in annual revenue for the city.135 
In November 2014, the city selected CityBridge’s “LinkNYC” as 
the winning bid.136  LinkNYC kiosks promised internet access and 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Van Wagner, Statement of Qualifications & Technical Proposal 5 (July 18, 
2014) (on file with the author). 
 126. LQD NYC, LQD WiFi NYC Response 6–7, 41 (July 21, 2014) [hereinafter 
LQD Bid] (on file with the author). 
 127. U.S. Postal Service, Expanding Full Participation in the Digital Economy 1 
(July 21, 2014) [hereinafter Post Office Bid] (on file with the author). 
 128. Exhibit 8 to Complaint at 4, Telebeam Telecomm. Corp. v. City of New York, 
No. 1:14-cv-07100 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2014). 
 129. See FOIL Request, supra note 123. 
 130. LinkNYC Spy Stations, ELEVENTH HOPE CONFERENCE, INTERNET SOC’Y 
(July 24, 2016, 5:20PM) [hereinafter Internet Society Conference], 
https://livestream.com/internetsociety/hopeconf/videos/130816888 [https://perma.cc/
JC8X-6DKS] (remarks of Benjamin Dean, Columbia Univ. fellow and consultant). 
 131. See Frequently Asked Questions, LINKNYC, https://www.link.nyc/faq.html 
[https://perma.cc/QE3Z-74WK]; see also Nick Pinto, Google Is Transforming NYC’s 
Payphones into a ‘Personalized Propaganda Engine’, VILLAGE VOICE (July 6, 2016), 
https://www.villagevoice.com/2016/07/06/google-is-transforming-nycs-payphones-into-
a-personalized-propaganda-engine/ [https://perma.cc/E7MW-VG9P]. See generally 
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http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/923-14/de-blasio-administration-
winner-competition-replace-payphones-five-borough [https://perma.cc/3T3B-FP5J]; 
2018] “WE KNOW NOT WHERE WE GO” 719 
city information services at the kiosks’ tablets,137 free high-speed Wi-
Fi, free phone calls, and to funnel back to the city about half of the $1 
billion in advertising revenue expected over the life of the franchise 
agreement.138  The Wi-Fi ultimately provided by the kiosks was not 
only free, but also fast139: one estimate put the speed at 436 Mbps for 
downloads and 361 Mbps for uploads140—far faster than the FCC’s 
fixed broadband benchmark of 25 Mbps for downloads and 3 Mbps 
for uploads.141  Such speeds, some of the fastest of any such networks 
worldwide, are “dizzying.”142 “LinkNYC is ten times faster than New 
York’s existing public internet, and infinitely quicker than [the public 
Wi-Fi at] Starbucks.”143  Mayor Bill de Blasio touted the project as 
one way to help close the city’s digital divide by providing free access 
to low-income New Yorkers who rely on mobile devices.144  The 
kiosks were part of the city’s efforts to expand broadband 
deployment and availability.145 
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11/18/nyregion/pay-phones-in-new-york-city-will-become-free-wi-fi-hot-spots.html 
[https://nyti.ms/2sbemTV]; De Blasio Administration Announces Winner, supra note 
136. 
 145. Transcript, Press Release: Mayor de Blasio Announces Public Launch of 
LinkNYC Program, Largest and Fastest Free Municipal Wi-Fi Network in the World 
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The public viewed LinkNYC cautiously as a step toward closing 
the digital divide by bringing the internet to the poor146 and the 
homeless.147  The program also proved popular: by January 2017, 
more than one million people had signed up to access the kiosks’ Wi-
Fi service on their mobile devices.148  By that point, about 71% of 
New Yorkers were aware of the kiosks, and of them, about 92% felt 
they were a positive addition to the city, according to a city-
commissioned survey.149 
The LinkNYC kiosks were also billed as secure and respectful of 
users’ personal data.150  The city said that users’ personal data would 
be protected because the kiosk network would be one of the largest 
encrypted public Wi-Fi networks.151  The privacy policy was billed as 
“customer-first” and one that would “ensure[] personal information is 
never shared or sold for third party use.”152 
The new service was not without its hiccups and criticisms, 
however.  First, some questioned whether the kiosks would actually 
do enough to close the digital divide.153  Some city officials 
complained that the franchise agreement would exacerbate the digital 
divide between richer Manhattan neighborhoods—where more 
lucrative advertising revenues incentivized a quicker and more 
extensive rollout of the kiosks—and poorer neighborhoods that were 
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less attractive to advertisers.154  The city made changes to the 
franchise agreement before it was approved to placate those 
concerns.155  In addition, the free internet access at the tablets on the 
kiosks led some users to gather for hours at kiosks,156 watching 
pornography,157 drinking, and doing drugs.158  LinkNYC responded 
by reducing the volume on the kiosk speakers after a certain hour159 
and removing internet browsing capabilities from the kiosk tablets.160  
Other features remained unchanged, including the fast wireless 
internet, access to city services on the tablets, free phone calls, cell 
phone charging, and 311 and 911 access.161  City officials have said 
they are open to restoring the internet access if they can properly 
filter objectionable content and set time limits.162 
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Yorkers, CBS N.Y. (June 13, 2016, 11:31 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/
2016/06/13/free-wi-fi-kiosks/ [https://perma.cc/HQF2-7KRJ]. 
 160. Service Update, LINKNYC (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.link.nyc/service-
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LinkNYC’s privacy protections were also met less enthusiastically 
by privacy activists and the technology press: in fact, one headline 
said the LinkNYC kiosks amounted to a “privacy nightmare.”163  The 
use of advertising revenue to fund such an ambitious project was 
described as a “Faustian bargain”: trading personal privacy for 
ubiquitous tracking by advertisers.164  A representative for the city’s 
public advocate, Letitia James, had urged the city to reject the 
LinkNYC deal because of concerns that the lack of competition 
among franchisees could harm civil liberties, among other concerns.165  
Some New Yorkers expressed vague concerns over possible 
information sharing.166  LinkNYC officials confirmed that they would 
hand over information about users from the kiosks to the police if 
legally required.167  Adding to the unease, Titan, one of the backers of 
CityBridge, had been installing tracking beacons in its existing 
payphones without any public notice and was forced by the city to 
remove them once the news broke.168 
But it was LinkNYC’s privacy policy, which users must accept to 
access the kiosk’s services,169 that was met with particular scorn.  Civil 
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liberties groups, such as the New York Civil Liberties Union, decried 
LinkNYC’s privacy policy as hopelessly vague about what sorts of 
data and information it would actually collect from users (such as 
what websites users visit and what links they click on) or how long 
LinkNYC might keep their data on file.170  That data also could 
reveal much personal information about individual users if 
aggregated.171  Similarly, even though CityBridge’s policy said that it 
would not sell personally identifiable information, it did say that it 
“may” “share” that data with others, including law enforcement and 
anyone who might acquire CityBridge.172  The privacy policy was 
hard to find, as well: the policy that CityBridge posted on LinkNYC’s 
website only applied to that website, not the kiosks themselves.173  
Whether, and how easily, law enforcement could access the data was 
unclear in the policy.174  Critics complained that it was not apparent 
why the kiosks would be mounted with cameras and who would be 
able to see the camera and sensor feeds.175  One possibility suggested 
was that the video feed could significantly expand the NYPD’s 
already vast camera network in the Domain Awareness System.176  
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The cameras also could collect information on passersby who never 
agreed to the privacy policy.177  Indeed, the vague privacy policy 
seemed to lead to a perverse outcome: instead of closing the digital 
divide, LinkNYC would subject poor communities dependent on its 
free Wi-Fi to even more mass surveillance by law enforcement than 
ever before.178 
Why would CityBridge want to collect all this information?  The 
goal of LinkNYC’s private developers is not just to close the digital 
divide but also to make money.179  Even if the city has described 
LinkNYC benignly as “the largest and fastest network of its kind,” 
advertisers see it as the “one of the largest digital [out-of-home 
advertising] networks in the world.”180  All of that data provides a 
rich trove for a deep analysis by advertisers.181  Indeed, targeting 
advertising directly at specific people by using the data harvested 
from users seemed to be a driving force behind the companies that 
developed the kiosks.182  The kiosks can allegedly use that data to 
create location-specific targeted advertising that is more valuable to 
advertisers.183  The targeted advertising capabilities were also billed 
to advertisers as a key feature of the new kiosks, even though that 
possibility was obscured from users in the privacy policy.184  All the 
data that LinkNYC is able to collect from users, cameras trained on 
pedestrians, and sensors monitoring traffic and environmental factors 
would allow City Bridge to generate $30,000 a year from each 
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kiosk.185  Essentially, the privacy policy was so vague that CityBridge 
could “collect anything and do anything.”186  LinkNYC officials said 
they did not plan to sell aggregated data.187 
Then, a year after the New York Civil Liberties Union and other 
groups first criticized the policy and the public outcry erupted, 
CityBridge announced that it would change the policy.188  The new 
policy was more specific about the data CityBridge would collect and 
how long it would retain that data.189  The new policy said that it 
would only store “technical” data used to connect to the Wi-Fi for 
sixty days after inactivity.190  Camera data would only be stored for 
seven days,191 and video footage and other data could be obtained by 
law enforcement only through an official request such as a court 
order.192  The new policy also promised that it “will not use facial 
recognition technology for any reason . . .  [or the] cameras to track 
your movement throughout the city.”193  The policy still, however, 
said that LinkNYC could identify users’ “general” location.194  The 
New York Civil Liberties Union and city officials praised the 
changes.195  
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Nevertheless, the kiosks continue to generate tension between the 
much-praised goal of bringing internet access to more New Yorkers 
and concerns about what user data these kiosks run by a private 
entity may, or could, collect.196  For example, the privacy policy can 
still be changed at any time.197  The information that LinkNYC 
collects even under its more restrictive policy is still highly personal 
and could be de-anonymized.198  Brooklyn residents have circulated 
petitions opposing the kiosks over surveillance concerns, and in 
Manhattan, some of the kiosks’ cameras have been covered with 
tape.199  Digital privacy group Electronic Frontier Foundation said 
that even though the changes were welcome, the process of changing 
the privacy policy remained “opaque.”200 
II.  JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO THE TECHNOLOGIES THAT MAKE UP 
LINKNYC KIOSKS 
LinkNYC’s kiosks combine into a single device several 
technologies and tracking capabilities that courts have addressed in 
different lines of cases and using various standards.  Information 
about where New Yorkers travel throughout the city each day could 
                                                                                                                 
 196. Compare April 2017 Council Hearing, supra note 178, at 41 (statement of 
James Vacca) (“[W]e all love them[.]”), with id. at 4 (statement of James Vacca) 
(“[T]he city is executing several projects to provide internet to low income 
individuals most notably the ongoing roll out of LinkNYC and the expansion of 
broadband services in NYCHA developments.  These efforts are to be commended 
but also represent an area in which we must be particularly vigilant.  Many national 
studies indicate that lower income people are disproportionately burdened by data 
collection and privacy violations.  Additionally, data digital advertising all too often 
targets these groups. Privacy is not a luxury item but a fundamental right of all 
people.”). 
 197. The privacy policy states that users who provided an email address will be 
notified if the privacy policy changes and will then have an opportunity to stop using 
LinkNYC “if they do not consent to the changes.” March 2017 LinkNYC Privacy 
Policy, supra note 190, at 6.  Similarly, the NYPD’s privacy policy for its Domain 
Awareness System contains limits on how long the NYPD can store data, but those 
limits can be extended if there is a “continuing law enforcement or public safety value 
or legal necessity.” N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, Public Security Privacy Guidelines 4 (Apr. 2, 
2009), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/crime_prevention/public_
security_privacy_guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QFN-UJ7H]. 
 198. See Buttar & Kalia, supra note 175 (noting that the new policy still collects 
some personally identifiable information); Pinto, supra note 131 (describing how 
even anonymized “technical” information about device hardware can be used to 
identify specific people). 
 199. Deanna Paul, Use the Wi-Fi and Smile for the Camera: LinkNYC Kiosks 
Come Uptown, THE UPTOWNER (Oct. 18, 2017), https://theuptowner.org/use-the-wi-
fi-and-smile-for-the-camera-linknyc-kiosks-come-uptown/ [https://perma.cc/X6ST-
GHH2]. 
 200. Buttar & Kalia, supra note 175. 
2018] “WE KNOW NOT WHERE WE GO” 727 
be collected in multiple ways: their real-time movements tracked as 
they move around the city; their historical movements could be 
analyzed by government investigators; and even those who have 
never logged in could be tracked using the video cameras mounted on 
the kiosks and facial recognition software.  Depending on which 
version of its privacy policy is at issue, LinkNYC may collect this 
information or not, or could hand it over to the government without 
even informing users.  The law treats these different types of location 
data201 differently: some jurisdictions require a warrant, others do not; 
in some jurisdictions these questions are percolating through appeals; 
and in others, these types of location data have yet to be addressed by 
a court or legislature at all. 
LinkNYC and other smart city initiatives pose myriad privacy 
issues, including vulnerability to hackers and private companies 
selling personal information to advertisers or other third parties.  This 
Note, however, focuses on the clash between law enforcement and 
citizens’ privacy as courts struggle to react to rapid technological 
change.  Specifically, how does the technology facilitate tracking a 
person’s location, and what must law enforcement do to gain access to 
the location data collected by the kiosks? 
A. Fourth Amendment “Expectations of Privacy” and the  
“Third-Party Doctrine” 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and 
seizures” by the government unless a judge determines that law 
enforcement has probable cause to conduct the search and the judge 
issues a warrant.202  But what counts as a search, and what is 
unreasonable? 
In 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court in Katz v. United States203 said 
that one way to evaluate whether a search is constitutional without a 
warrant is to consider “expectations of privacy.”204  Prior to Katz, the 
Court had articulated a trespass-based approach to Fourth 
Amendment searches—that is, a search requiring a warrant occurred 
whenever the government made “an unauthorized physical 
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encroachment within a constitutionally protected area.”205  As the 
Court noted several years before Katz in Silverman v. United 
States,206 what matters was not just “the technicality of a trespass” but 
“the reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected 
area.”207 
In Katz, the Court redefined the reach of its trespass-based test208 
and replaced it with what became known as the “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” test.209  In Katz, the government had placed 
an electronic listening device on the outside of a telephone booth to 
hear what a suspect inside was saying over the telephone.210  The 
Court held that this was a search that violated the Fourth 
Amendment because the police did not have a warrant.211  In doing 
so, the Court abandoned its focus in Fourth Amendment cases on a 
physical trespass occurring.212  In a concurrence, Justice John M. 
Harlan II articulated the Court’s new “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” test as “a twofold requirement”: “first that a person have 
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, 
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”213  But what is “reasonable” has not always been clear.  
In the years since articulating the test, “the meaning of the phrase 
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ remains remarkably opaque” and 
scholars have found the confusion over application of the test to be an 
“embarrassment.”214 
In addition to the “reasonable expectation of privacy,” another 
long-held standard in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is the 
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controversial “third-party doctrine.”215  “The rule is simple: By 
disclosing information to a third party, the subject gives up all of his 
Fourth Amendment rights in the information revealed.”216  The 
doctrine has roots in Katz, in which the Court noted that “[w]hat a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or 
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”217  The 
Court further refined the doctrine in the 1970s cases United States v. 
Miller218 and Smith v. Maryland.219  In Miller, the Court said that a 
person suspected of tax fraud had no expectation of privacy in his 
bank records because he had known the bank might show the records 
to others when he gave the information to the bank.220  Similarly, in 
Smith, the Court said that there is no expectation of privacy in the 
phone numbers a person dials because people know that the phone 
company keeps a record of those calls.221  In addition to those 
articulations of the third-party doctrine, the Court has also held that 
people do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when 
traveling along public thoroughfares, such as driving a car along a 
highway, because doing so knowingly exposes the person to “anyone 
who wanted to look.”222  This doctrine, too, has been criticized.223 
As indicated by Katz and the third-party doctrine, while 
government surveillance is typically subject to a warrant requirement, 
commercial transactions that implicate the third-party doctrine are 
held to a much lower standard.224  Modern technology, such as “smart 
home” devices that communicate intimate data to technology 
companies, has expanded the pervasiveness of data that could be 
handed over to law enforcement without a warrant under the 
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doctrine.225  Indeed, as the “frightening paraphernalia”226 of modern 
technology has advanced, that distinction and the differences between 
the Katz and third-party doctrine concepts have been questioned.227  
The clash of these and other concepts in Fourth Amendment search 
jurisprudence have shown up in the cases that deal with technology 
embedded in the LinkNYC kiosks: real-time location tracking, 
historical location data collected by cell phone providers, and facial 
recognition technology.228  
B. Tracking Real-Time Location Using GPS Technology 
After relying on Justice Harlan’s test in the ensuing decades,229 the 
Court in 2012 questioned its own Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
with its decision in United States v. Jones.230  In Jones, the police had 
surreptitiously placed a global positioning system (“GPS”) device on 
a suspect’s car and tracked his movements for twenty-eight days.231  
All the justices said that doing so without a warrant was an 
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unconstitutional search—but they were divided across three opinions 
as to why.232 
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for five justices, said that the Katz 
test did not replace the Court’s earlier trespass-based approach: it 
merely supplemented the trespass doctrine for use in cases where no 
physical trespass had occurred.233  Justice Scalia said that because 
there was a physical intrusion into a space—the police physically 
placing the GPS device on the suspect’s car—there was no need to 
invoke the Katz test to find an unconstitutional search.234 
Justice Samuel Alito, writing for four justices, agreed that the 
police needed a warrant to attach the GPS device to the car, but not 
because of the trespass.  Instead, he said long-term surveillance of a 
suspect’s location without a warrant was unreasonable under the Katz 
test.235  Justice Alito criticized the majority for resurrecting the 
“repeatedly criticized” trespass-based rule.236  Among other reasons, 
he noted that the trespass-based rule will create problems in a digital 
world: increasingly, the movements of an object like a car can be 
tracked electronically without any physical contact with the object to 
be tracked.237 
Justice Alito also questioned whether the Court was the best place 
to resolve such thorny issues.  The Katz test is far from perfect, and 
judges often “confuse their own expectations of privacy with those of 
the hypothetical reasonable person to which the Katz test looks.”238  
The test is further complicated by the increasingly rapid pace of 
technological change, keeping public opinion about privacy 
expectations “in flux.”239  People may continue to object to some 
practices, or they could decide that the conveniences they receive in 
exchange for decreased privacy are worthwhile.240  Against such a 
backdrop, legislative solutions are perhaps better than judicial fiat, he 
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said.241  In fact, Congress passed wiretapping legislation shortly after 
the Katz decision.242 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor provided the fifth vote for Justice Scalia’s 
opinion, but supported both Justice Scalia’s argument and Justice 
Alito’s argument in her own concurrence.243  She agreed with Justice 
Scalia that the Katz test augmented, but did not eliminate, the 
trespass test, which she described as an “irreducible constitutional 
minimum.”244  But she also agreed with Justice Alito’s assessment 
that long-term warrantless GPS tracking is unreasonable and that the 
Katz rubric is still necessary in the modern world because “physical 
intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of surveillance.”245  “In 
cases of electronic or other novel modes of surveillance that do not 
depend upon a physical invasion on property, the majority opinion’s 
trespassory test may provide little guidance.”246 
Justice Sotomayor also cast doubt on “two of the oldest and most 
criticized doctrines in modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence”: 
the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test and the third-party 
doctrine.247  She said GPS technology is particularly susceptible to 
government abuse248 because it “generates a precise, comprehensive 
record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail 
about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations.”249  She also said that the third-party doctrine is “ill 
suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of 
information about themselves to third parties in the course of 
carrying out mundane tasks.”250  However, because the particular 
search at issue in Jones could be resolved solely on the basis of the 
trespass, she said there was no need to decide those issues.251 
Justice Sotomayor’s critique touched on the power of the “mosaic” 
theory—that is, that law enforcement can glean incredibly revealing 
knowledge about a person when aggregating bits of data that are 
individually innocuous, especially with the help of modern 
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technologies that go beyond just GPS tracking.252  One such modern 
technological tool is “metadata,” the bits of digital information that 
are generated when creating a document or using the internet that the 
user might not realize are there.253  For example, metadata in a 
Microsoft Word document might reveal when it was created, whose 
computer it was written on, or what edits were made to it.254  
Similarly, browsing the internet can leave traces of metadata, such as 
email addresses, photos, computer location information, and the 
like.255  Like the long-term location tracking at issue in Jones and the 
New York state case People v. Weaver,256 discussed below, such data 
points can reveal a great deal about a person, especially when 
aggregated.257  Even though it can be just as revealing, such metadata 
typically comes without the legal protections that the contents of 
communications themselves would have.258  Metadata from telephone 
calls, such as who a person calls and when, can reveal sensitive 
information as readily as the contents of those calls, such as gun 
ownership or a medical diagnosis.259  In striking down a vast 
telephone metadata collection program run by the National Security 
Agency on statutory grounds in 2015, the Second Circuit noted how 
the power of metadata combined with the ubiquity of its collection by 
modern technology means that people “can barely function without 
involuntarily creating metadata that can reveal a great deal of 
information about them.”260 
New York, meanwhile, has approached the issue tackled by the 
split Jones ruling in a different way.  Confronting similar facts in 2009, 
New York’s highest court found in People v. Weaver that its state 
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Metadata, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5539, 5539–40 (2016). 
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constitution prohibited the warrantless GPS tracking of a suspect for 
sixty-five days.261 
The court said that GPS technology made the case different than 
earlier cases about tracking motor vehicles along public roads.262  In 
United States v. Knotts,263 the U.S. Supreme Court had held that 
police use of a “beeper,” which transmitted a signal that made it 
easier for a police car to follow a suspect’s car, did not require a 
warrant because the suspect did not have an expectation of privacy 
while driving on a public road.264  But the New York Court of 
Appeals said that GPS is not a “mere enhancement of human sensory 
capacity” comparable to a beeper.265  “GPS is a vastly different and 
exponentially more sophisticated and powerful technology that is 
easily and cheaply deployed and has virtually unlimited and 
remarkably precise tracking capability.”266  Echoing concerns that 
Justice Sotomayor would later raise in Jones, the court warned that 
law enforcement can use GPS-tracked movements to collect a 
“breathtaking quality and quantity” of personal information to create 
“a highly detailed profile, not simply of where we go, but by easy 
inference, of our associations—political, religious, amicable and 
amorous, to name only a few—and of the pattern of our professional 
and avocational pursuits.”267  In light of the differences between 
beepers and GPS, the court rejected the idea that being on a public 
roadway negated all expectations of privacy.268  Such warrantless 
tracking was therefore prohibited.269 
However, the court noted that the issue was unsettled in federal 
law.270  Rather than relying on any federal precedent, it based its 
ruling on article I, section 12 of the New York State Constitution, the 
analogous provision to the Federal Fourth Amendment.271  The state 
provision provided greater protection, the court said, and relied on a 
line of cases on searches and seizures independent from federal 
law.272  The court said protecting New Yorkers from unreasonable 
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searches in the face of new technology was more important than 
aligning state constitutional standards with federal ones.273 
In dissent, Judge Susan Phillips Read said that it should be the 
legislature, and not the courts, who regulates such new technology.274  
Judge Read criticized the court’s majority for imposing a bright-line 
rule and “constitutionalizing” GPS.275  The legislature, she said, can 
better weigh New Yorkers concerns’ with privacy and security, 
“balance these competing values and fashion a comprehensive 
regulatory program.”276 
The line the court drew in Weaver is not necessarily brighter than 
the one the multiple opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court tried to 
draw in Jones : subsequent decisions have had to deal with other 
applications of Weaver.  For example, in 2013 the New York Court of 
Appeals found that a state agency did not need to obtain a warrant 
before attaching a GPS device to an employee’s car to investigate 
whether a state employee was falsifying time sheets because such a 
search fell into a “workplace” exception to the warrant 
requirement.277  But the search was still unconstitutionally 
unreasonable because the State did not limit its search to business 
hours.278  Also in 2013, a trial court judge found that “pinging” a 
suspect’s cell phone to determine his current location without a 
warrant was permitted under both Jones and Weaver.279  In 2017, a 
state trial judge suggested that other types of location-tracking 
technology required warrants under Weaver.280 
C. Tracking Real-Time and Historical Location Using Cell Phones 
In addition to GPS devices, law enforcement can also track a 
person’s location using a cell phone.281  When a person’s cell phone is 
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 274. Id. at 457–59 (Read, J., dissenting). 
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on, it reveals its approximate location by periodically pinging nearby 
cell phone towers.282  The cellular phone company stores that data.283  
The third-party doctrine has meant that law enforcement can easily 
obtain historical location data collected by cell phones (cell-site 
location information or “CSLI”).284  Under the Federal Stored 
Communications Act, instead of using an ordinary subpoena that can 
be obtained without the showing of probable cause required for a 
warrant, law enforcement must show “reasonable grounds” to obtain 
CSLI.285  Some state laws require law enforcement to obtain a 
warrant to access the historical CSLI that is created by this process 
and stored by cellular phone companies.286  But because the CSLI is 
voluntarily given by the person’s cell phone to the cellular phone 
company, the third-party doctrine places it outside the Fourth 
Amendment protections in federal cases.287 
Five federal circuit courts have held that the third-party doctrine 
applies to CSLI—but only after “generat[ing] 18 separate majority, 
concurring, and dissenting opinions” that “attempt[] to grapple with 
the same basic issue.”288  One of those courts, the Sixth Circuit, held 
that the third-party doctrine meant that the police did not need a 
warrant to obtain 127 days’ worth of CSLI about a robbery suspect.289  
A host of different groups, including libertarian groups,290 defense 
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attorneys,291 scholars,292 journalists,293 technology companies,294 
technology experts,295 privacy advocates,296 and others urged the U.S. 
Supreme Court to hear an appeal of the Sixth Circuit’s ruling, while 
law enforcement groups297 and others298 argued that the decision 
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should stand.  The U.S. Supreme Court has decided to hear that 
appeal, Carpenter v. United States,299 and possibly resolve the CSLI 
issue.  The justices’ questions during oral arguments suggested, 
commentators said, that a majority wanted to somehow limit the 
government’s power to collect CSLI without a warrant, but had little 
idea how to do so.300  “[T]his is an open box,” Justice Stephen Breyer 
remarked, “[w]e know not where we go.”301  Any changes the Court 
might make in Carpenter to the third-party doctrine could have 
implications for issues as diverse as revenge porn, medical records, 
and National Security Agency programs.302 
No matter how Carpenter ultimately comes out, it involves CSLI 
obtained from cellular phone companies—but law enforcement can 
collect real-time location information from a cell phone itself without 
going through those companies.303  One of the more controversial 
methods is with devices called cell-site simulators or sometimes by the 
trade name “Stingrays.”304  The briefcase-sized device surreptitiously 
mimics a cell phone tower, “pinging” nearby devices to collect data 
from them, such as their location and even what numbers they have 
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dialed.305  The mock cell phone towers also collect information from 
nearby non-suspects whose phones are also pinged.306  Federal law 
enforcement has also deployed similar devices in airplanes, vastly 
increasing their range.307 
The technology was largely secret for years.308  Law enforcement 
agencies worked hard to hide information about their cell-site 
simulators from defense attorneys, judges, and the public, going so far 
as to drop cases instead of reveal the technology309 or even lying to 
judges.310  After more information came to light about law 
enforcement use of the devices, federal policy changed311 to require 
federal law enforcement to seek a warrant before using a cell-site 
simulator.312  State law enforcement agencies, however, are not bound 
by the federal policy.313  The NYPD used cell-site simulators more 
than 1000 times between 2008 and 2015,314 but did not acknowledge 
that it used the devices until 2016.315  The New York Civil Liberties 
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Union has sued for more information about how much money the 
department spends on the devices.316 
Now that more is known about how such devices are used, some 
courts have also pushed back: a New York state judge,317 the District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals,318 a Maryland appeals court,319 and 
some federal district courts320 have found that law enforcement must 
obtain a warrant before using a cell-site simulator.  Courts have noted 
that historical cell site data, which the government obtains from a cell 
phone company that is voluntarily storing it through the third-party 
doctrine, is different from a cell-site simulator—rather than getting 
location data that someone else collected, cell-site simulators actively 
send signals to a cell phone to force it to reveal its location.321 
D. Tracking Location Using Facial Recognition Technology 
Other location-tracking features made possible by the kiosks—
notably, increasingly sophisticated facial recognition technology—
face an even more uncertain reception in the courts than other types 
of location data. 
Facial recognition technology, also made possible by LinkNYC, 
adds a new dimension to the case law.  Long within the realm of 
science fiction, facial recognition is now technologically feasible.322  
Camera software can analyze a face plucked out from a crowd and 
compare it to a database of photos to identify that person.323  Courts 
have held that cameras in public places can collect images with little 
to no restrictions—even if trained toward private property—because 
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there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in video footage “that 
recorded the same views enjoyed by passersby on public roads.”324 
For individual recognition, facial recognition technology must be 
able to compare the images it captures to other images stored in a 
database.325  Similar technology is used in automated license-plate 
readers, which take photographs of cars’ license plates, convert those 
photographs into data that can be read by a computer, and then 
compare them to a database of license plates.326  Both federal and 
New York state courts have said that the Fourth Amendment is not 
implicated when a police officer searches for a license plate number in 
a government database,327 suggesting that an automated query by a 
license-plate reader—or facial recognition software—might also be 
permissible.  But the mass, automated collection of people’s 
movements through the license plate reader technology could also be 
so broad that it violates the Weaver court’s prohibition on such 
massive collection of location data.328 
Yet there is no state or federal statute governing the use of facial 
recognition technology by law enforcement.329  Some states do, 
however, have laws that restrict the use of biometric data, like facial 
                                                                                                                 
 324. United States v. Houston, 813 F.3d 282, 287–90 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 
137 S. Ct. 567 (2016); see also People v. Bauer, 528 N.Y.S.3d 153, 153–54 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1988) (holding that police can take photographs of people in public spaces 
without a warrant). 
 325. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 322, at 3–4. 
 326. NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE 
READERS 1–2 (2016), https://www.nacdl.org/uploadedFiles/files/criminal_defense/
fourth_amendment/2016-4-28_ALPR%20Primer_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/EUT8-
LGU7]. 
 327. See, e.g., United States v. Miranda-Sotolongo, 827 F.3d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 
2016) (finding that entering a license plate number, which was in plain view in public, 
into a database of license plate numbers did not violate the Fourth Amendment); 
United States v. Ellison, 462 F.3d 557, 563 (6th Cir. 2006) (same); People v. Bushey, 
75 N.E.3d 1165, 1169 (N.Y. 2017) (finding that such a search was neither a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment nor of the New York State Constitution). But see Ellison, 
462 F.3d at 567–72 (Moore, J., dissenting) (arguing that suspicionless searches of 
computer databases are “in tension” with other Fourth Amendment concerns). 
 328. People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 446 (2009) (“[D]ragnet use of the [GPS] 
technology at the sole discretion of law enforcement authorities to pry into the details 
of people’s daily lives is not consistent with the values at the core of our State 
Constitution’s prohibition against unreasonable searches.”). But see id. at 460 n.1 
(Smith, J., dissenting) (“This case . . . involves the use of GPS monitoring technology 
in the criminal investigation of an individual suspect, not dragnet-type or mass 
surveillance.”). 
 329. “[T]here are currently no New York or federals laws, and no generally 
accepted scientific standards, controlling the use of facial recognition by law 
enforcement.” Memorandum of Law in Support of Verified Petition at 1, Ctr. of 
Privacy & Tech. v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, No. 154060/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 2, 2017). 
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recognition technology, by private companies.330  But what should the 
law say about facial recognition?  Tort laws about privacy have been 
criticized as inadequate to deal with facial recognition technology.331  
Meanwhile, law enforcement is expanding its use of people’s images 
in databases: sixteen states let the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
access their databases of driver’s license photos to use in its own facial 
recognition software.332  As many as thirty states allow facial 
recognition searches of some kind of their databases.333  The 
technology is not always that effective: the FBI itself has 
acknowledged that it identifies the wrong person twenty percent of 
the time.334 
The NYPD had been tight-lipped about its use not only of facial 
recognition technology335 but also of other technological policing 
tools like predictive policing software.336  LinkNYC’s current privacy 
policy states that it will not use facial recognition technology.337  But 
without legal standards, law enforcement is free to use facial 
                                                                                                                 
 330. See Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(a) 
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[https://perma.cc/9BM3-NQM6]. 
 334. GAO-16-267, supra note 332, at 26–27. 
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Dep’t, No. 154060/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 2, 2017) (request under state freedom of 
information law for documents about NYPD’s use of facial recognition technology).  
The NYPD later agreed to release some documents. See So Ordered Stipulation of 
Adjournment at 2, Ctr. of Privacy & Tech., No. 154060/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 28, 
2018). 
 336. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Verified Petition at 13, Brennan Ctr. 
for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, No. 160541/2016 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Dec. 15, 2016) (request under state freedom of information law for 
documents about NYPD’s use of predictive policing technology after its “egregious” 
refusal to provide relevant documents).  A state judge later ordered the NYPD to 
produce some of the documents. See Decision & Judgment at 15, Brennan Ctr. for 
Justice, No. 160541/2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 27, 2017). 
 337. March 2017 LinkNYC Privacy Policy, supra note 190, at 6. 
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recognition technology wherever it has access to cameras without 
taking precautions to protect privacy.338 
E. Judges and the Public Have Different Ideas About Privacy 
While courts grabble over what is a “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” in the digital age, the public has its own ideas.  For example, 
many people are willing to freely hand over their personal 
information if they receive a valuable service in return, despite 
concerns raised by LinkNYC and other modern technology.339  
Indeed, New York and CityBridge trumpeted the more than one 
million users who logged into the LinkNYC network in its first year 
and the seventy-eight percent of New Yorkers who had a favorable 
view of the network.340  LinkNYC reached those milestones before 
the newer, less-intrusive privacy policy was rolled out.  But overall, 
the public is divided over how to balance privacy and the disclosure of 
their personal information.341 
Like the public, judges themselves do not always agree on what is 
“reasonable.”  The split Jones and Weaver courts, the conflicting 
ways cell-site location data is treated, and the uncertainty of new, 
emerging technologies like facial recognition highlight this judicial 
divide.  Academics have argued over what factors judges should 
consider—such as public views—in a “reasonableness” analysis.342  
Judges have also critiqued each other’s views on the subject.  In 
Jones, Justice Sotomayor took issue with what Justice Alito 
speculated people would consider a reasonable tradeoff when 
sacrificing privacy for convenience.343  Indeed, what privacy 
                                                                                                                 
 338. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-489T, FACE 
RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY: DOJ & FBI NEED TO TAKE ADDITIONAL ACTIONS TO 
ENSURE PRIVACY & ACCURACY 7–11 (2017). 
 339. LEE RAINIE & MAEVE DUGGAN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., PRIVACY & 
INFORMATION SHARING 2 (2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2016/01/PI_
2016.01.14_Privacy-and-Info-Sharing_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2AR-MLHG]. 
 340. See One Million Users Press Release, supra note 148. 
 341. RAINIE & DUGGAN, supra note 339, at 2–3 (“[T]he phrase that best captures 
Americans’ views on the choice between privacy vs. disclosure of personal 
information is, ‘It depends.’ People’s views on the key tradeoff of the modern, digital 
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for something of value—are shaped by both the conditions of the deal and the 
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 342. See generally Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth 
Amendment: Reassessing Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1, 
18–22 (2011) (discussing the debate over whether the severity of the charged crime 
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 343. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417–18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
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limitations are people prepared to recognize as “reasonable”?  As 
Justice Alito noted, courts often substitute their own idea of 
reasonableness for that of “the hypothetical reasonable person.”344  Is 
there a difference between the judgment of a “reasonable person” 
and that of a judge? 
There is a danger in drawing bright lines on particular technologies 
and locking in a judicial rule345: public views about privacy often do 
not align with the hard rules courts have laid down.346  Several 
attempts have been made to empirically study what people would 
actually consider reasonable expectations of privacy.347  One recent 
study found people believed that the police should obtain a warrant 
before searching a suspect’s cell phone.348  The Supreme Court has 
agreed that this expectation is reasonable—when the search is 
incident to arrest.349  But people also believed that the police should 
obtain a warrant before accessing cell phone data from cellular 
towers.350  Federal circuit courts have found the opposite.351 
                                                                                                                 
 344. Id. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 345. See People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 458–59 (2009) (Read, J., dissenting) 
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TECH. 111, 112–13 (2016); see also Henry F. Fradella et al., Quantifying Katz: 
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Amendment Context, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 289, 293 (2011); Marc McAllister, The 
Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: The Misapplication of Analogical 
Reasoning, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 475, 522 (2012). See generally Christopher Slobogin & 
Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in 
Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and 
Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993). 
 348. See Smith et al., supra note 347, at 134. 
 349. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014) (“Our answer to the 
question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an 
arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”). 
 350. See Smith et al., supra note 347, at 133–34. 
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Still, people’s views on the privacy-convenience tradeoff depend on 
the particular technology and data at issue, and who is looking at it.  
A Pew Research Center study found that in commercial settings, 
people view the collection of location data taken from their cell 
phones more negatively than other types of data gathering.352  Many 
people said that they did not like it when their data is collected for 
one purpose but then “used for other, often more invasive 
purposes.”353  Study participants also said they were frustrated by 
“how hard they feel it is to get information about what is collected 
and uncertainty about who is collecting the data” and wanted data 
collection to be controlled through legal and technological means.354  
Another study conducted by Professor Christopher Slobogin asked 
participants about how intrusive they viewed various types of 
searches subject to different levels of Fourth Amendment protection 
and compared those findings to how intrusive they viewed a public 
network of police cameras spaced 300 yards apart from each other 
with the ability to zoom in and out.355  Survey respondents said the 
camera network was more intrusive than a police vehicle checkpoint 
or roadblock, which the U.S. Supreme Court has held is a search 
requiring a warrant.356  Professor Slobogin’s other surveys have also 
shown that government searches of people’s internet activity and 
transactions with their banks and pharmacies “are perceived to be as 
intrusive as a search of a car.”357 
How then to thread the needle between people’s views of what 
they want kept private and courts’ struggle to understand the privacy 
implications of new technologies?  As Judge Read noted in her 
                                                                                                                 
 351. See discussion supra Section II.C. 
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 353. Id. at 6. 
 354. Id. at 7. 
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Weaver dissent, New Yorkers deserve “the full benefit of the 
carefully wrought balance between privacy and security interests.”358  
Courts may one day strike that balance.  But in the meantime, local 
legislatures and agencies can make those decisions today. 
III.  NEW YORK CITY CAN USE ITS CONTRACTING POWERS TO 
PROTECT PRIVACY IN THIRD-PARTY SMART CITY SERVICES SUCH 
AS LINKNYC 
New York City’s much-praised goals with the LinkNYC project—
closing the digital divide and making New York a smart city—stand in 
tension with the privacy concerns that continue to swirl around the 
kiosks.359  The LinkNYC kiosks combine into a single service the 
possibility of tracking a New Yorker’s current location, analyzing 
their activity with their historical movements, and even using facial 
recognition to track people who never even logged in to the kiosk.  
Therefore, if left to the courts, the kiosks’ historical location data (if 
collected) could be available to the police or might face a new test 
after the Carpenter case over CSLI.  The kiosks’ ability, albeit 
unused, to utilize facial recognition technology is untested by the 
courts.  Even the kiosks’ GPS tracking abilities would be subject to 
the divided reasoning of Jones and the unclear implications of 
Weaver—if, that is, those cases would even apply to LinkNYC 
because of its different mechanisms for tracking people.360  
Furthermore, despite the changes to the LinkNYC privacy policy, 
much discretion is still left to the private companies to change the 
policy, and there is no way to challenge them if they violate it.361  If 
New Yorkers do not know what information the kiosks are even 
collecting, it is difficult to challenge that collection in court.362  And 
                                                                                                                 
 358. People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 458–60 (2009) (Read, J., dissenting). 
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even if the use of a surveillance technology can be challenged, courts 
are still befuddled by contemporary expectations of privacy and are 
sometimes at odds with public opinion.363  With the judicial goalposts 
still shifting, local legislatures and agencies can protect privacy in 
networks they oversee, such as LinkNYC, while the issues percolate 
in the courts and the technology develops. 
A. Legislative Responses Can Protect Privacy While Courts  
Mull Issues 
In the court decisions grappling with GPS tracking, several judges 
noted that legislatures are better suited to resolve these issues than 
the courts.  In Jones, Justice Alito said that legislatures are better 
situated to understand public attitudes about privacy, make tradeoff 
decisions, and fashion comprehensive regulation among conflicting 
interests.364  “In circumstances involving dramatic technological 
change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative,” he 
wrote.365  In her dissent from the New York Court of Appeals 
decision about warrantless GPS tracking, Judge Read also called on 
the court to let the legislature act.366  New York’s legislature can 
fashion a legislative scheme that balances privacy and security, she 
said, just like many other state legislatures have done.367 
Commentators are divided over whether courts or legislatures are 
the appropriate place to regulate electronic surveillance, including 
technology such as wiretaps, video cameras, and data collection.368  
Legislative approaches have tended to be more protective of privacy, 
comprehensive in their regulation of the data collected, and flexible 
to changing technology.369  The judiciary, others argue, is less 
susceptible to law enforcement and industry capture, and courts could 
regulate surveillance more aggressively simply if they chose to.370  
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Federal considerations are also different and often, like judicial 
decisions, merely set a regulatory floor above which states and local 
governments can regulate.371  Indeed, most police surveillance is done 
by local law enforcement, so a national scheme might not make 
sense.372  “Surveillance that impinges solely on a particular locale, 
such as city-wide cameras systems, is probably best handled through 
municipal ordinances.”373 
Administrative rulemaking processes are another avenue to 
regulate surveillance by forcing public participation and an explicit 
weighing of pros and cons.374  In 2015, the New York Court of 
Appeals reaffirmed the power of city agencies to engage in 
rulemaking within their area of expertise that “fills in the details” left 
by legislation, as long as the agency is not doing its own 
policymaking.375  A group of taxicab owners had challenged 
regulations from the city’s Taxi and Limousine Commission 
mandating a particular make and model of car for use as iconic yellow 
taxis because the commission allegedly acted outside of the authority 
granted by the city council.376  But the court said the regulations were 
within the agency’s “extremely broad authority to enact rules” for the 
city’s taxis under the city charter because it balanced different groups’ 
concerns, did not regulate an area the city had failed to legislate, and 
acted within the limits set by the city council.377 
Much like the Taxi and Limousine Commission, the city’s charter 
gives the DoITT broad powers “to plan, formulate, coordinate and 
advance information technology and telecommunications policies for 
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the city.”378  Those powers extend to payphone and other franchise 
agreements,379 such as LinkNYC, and “to ensur[ing] security for data 
and other information handled by this department,”380 among other 
duties.381  Its decisions have been reviewed by courts382 and, like the 
Taxi and Limousine Commission, it cannot act beyond the powers 
granted to it by the charter and city council.383  But there is room to 
act within those limits: DoITT can fill in gaps left by the city council 
in a statute.384  DoITT has the power not only to grant payphone 
franchises, but to consider the impact of the payphones on the 
community.385  A court reviewing a DoITT action within its statutory 
authority will not disturb it as long as the agency decision was 
rational.386 
Both city and state lawmakers have shown an interest in regulating 
in this area.  At the time that the LinkNYC program was first 
proposed, concerns focused mostly on the digital divide.  In 2014, the 
city’s borough presidents worried that the then-proposed LinkNYC 
would not do enough to bridge the digital divide because kiosks 
would be concentrated disproportionately in wealthier neighborhoods 
where advertising revenues are higher.387  The proposal was 
subsequently altered to deploy more kiosks in boroughs outside 
Manhattan than had been planned in earlier proposals (although 
some lawmakers were still disappointed with the rollout).388 
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Now, New York lawmakers’ priorities have expanded into greater 
concern for privacy protections in services like LinkNYC.  Their 
efforts gained steam in the wake of the rescission of FCC regulations 
preventing internet service providers from selling customers’ data 
without their permission.389  For example, in April 2017, more than 
two dozen New York state legislators introduced bills in both 
chambers of the State Legislature that would prohibit the sale of 
consumers’ personally identifiable information to third-party 
advertisers without consumers’ consent.390  Those bills would also 
apply to entities like LinkNYC that have franchise agreements, or any 
entities that use the kiosk structures themselves.391 
In New York City, city officials have vowed to more vigorously 
protect New Yorkers’ privacy.  The city council committee that 
oversees LinkNYC has shown a willingness to require openness about 
the data it collects and how private companies use it.392  For example, 
the committee recently put forward a now-enacted local law that 
creates a task force to study how city agencies use automated 
processes in their decision-making and whether to require disclosure 
of the relevant computer code.393  Officials have also suggested that 
the city may use franchise agreements to enhance digital privacy 
protections for New Yorkers.394  At the April 24, 2017 meeting of the 
New York City Council’s technology committee, the committee’s 
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chairperson also asked about the repealed FCC regulations.395  City 
officials noted that even though LinkNYC is not technically an 
internet service provider, its privacy policy is stronger than what the 
now-rescinded FCC regulations would have mandated.396  Officials 
also said they “will continue to implement strict privacy policies for 
public wi-fi directly provided by the City, such as LinkNYC.”397  The 
de Blasio administration has also shown a willingness to engage with 
residents to decide how they want to deploy smart city technology in 
their own communities.  For example, the city began a series of 
planning meetings in March 2017 in the Brownsville neighborhood of 
Brooklyn to see how its residents would want to deploy smart city 
technologies.398 
B. Greater Transparency Empowers Both Judicial and  
Public Oversight 
With the ability to consider changing technology and weigh societal 
expectations of privacy, the power to do more to protect New 
Yorkers’ privacy, and the political will to do so, how can DoITT and 
elected city officials best enforce those goals?  The patchy, shifting 
nature of judicial pronouncements in this area presents a danger of 
paralysis in the face of uncertainty.  But the city can use its experience 
with the changing LinkNYC privacy policy—and the spirit of its other 
smart city initiatives—to make sure the kiosks’ mission of closing the 
digital divide for the city’s disadvantaged communities is realized 
without subjecting those same users to intrusive surveillance.  
Franchisees like LinkNYC should be required to reveal exactly what 
kind of information they are collecting and explain it clearly in a place 
where citizens can see it and the city council can review it.  This 
transparency is a central tenet of New York’s and other 
municipalities’ smart city initiatives, is palatable to technology 
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companies like LinkNYC, enhances judicial oversight, and can be 
embedded directly in the franchise agreements themselves. 
First, revealing more information about the data collected by the 
kiosks comports with the stated goals of municipal open data and 
other smart city initiatives, as well as New York City’s own stated 
goals.  City officials have already signaled that they want to protect 
privacy in the increasingly connected city.  An example of this is the 
city’s “Internet of Things” guidelines,399 which cover numerous 
devices connected to the internet that make smart city programs 
work.400  Even though the guidelines have been joined by twenty 
other cities,401 they are voluntary.  The city has also expressed its 
desire to fill the gap left by the now-rescinded federal data privacy 
regulations.402  New York City officials have said that, “where 
possible,” they want to “leverage” franchise agreements to improve 
privacy protections for New Yorkers.403 
Furthermore, advocates of open municipal data argue that it 
creates a “better understand[ing of] government decision-making, 
expand[s] knowledge of government services and transactions, and 
improve[s] access to government processes and decision-makers.”404  
That openness facilitates community engagement that can also ensure 
that surveillance technology is not imposed on communities, but is 
instead deployed with their support and for their ultimate benefit.405  
For example, surveillance technology can be used to deter not only 
crime, but also racial profiling and police brutality.406  But LinkNYC 
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2018] “WE KNOW NOT WHERE WE GO” 753 
does not currently explain how law enforcement may use data from 
the kiosks.407 
Second, private partners like LinkNYC have demonstrated that 
they are amenable to such transparency.  LinkNYC adopted a more-
protective privacy policy without pulling out of the franchise 
agreement or reducing its ambitions and goals.  Quite the opposite: 
the companies behind LinkNYC have already expanded it to 
London408 and have plans to launch in other cities,409 though locals in 
other cities are also concerned about the privacy implications.410  
Other revenue-restricting requirements, including prohibitions on 
certain types of advertising, are already embedded within the 
franchise agreement.411  If the city is concerned about providing Wi-Fi 
without saddling the city with the costs, the LinkNYC experience 
shows that vendors are still eager to provide digital services to the city 
even if they must guarantee New Yorkers more robust privacy 
protections.412 
Furthermore, other technology companies who may bid on future 
smart city initiatives are themselves quite aggressive about revealing 
information about government surveillance occurring on their 
networks.  Technology companies such as Twitter, Google, Cisco, 
Facebook, and others release aggregated data about how many and 
what types of requests law enforcement officials have made for user 
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data.413  Technology companies actually pushed for permission from 
the government to publish the data.414  They have also sued when the 
government has tried to prevent them from publishing the reports.415  
These “transparency reports”416 are not perfect,417 but they do reveal 
to the public how much the government is accessing data—not unlike 
the transparency goals that New York City has already codified in its 
open data law.418  Transparency about government data requests is 
also helpful to the companies’ bottom lines.419  In addition, some 
large technology companies have fought legal battles with the 
government over releasing user data, such as Google’s stance on the 
encryption of its smartphones420 and Microsoft’s fight to protect user 
data stored overseas.421  Technology companies’ willingness to fight 
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these battles and reveal government access to their users’ data 
suggests that New York City can likely require the same thing from 
vendors without losing any interest from potential bidders. 
Finally, proactively revealing information about law enforcement 
use of new technology is better at protecting privacy than court action 
alone; judicial oversight of the Fourth Amendment limits on massive 
and surreptitious data collection is only possible if the government is 
transparent about what data it is collecting and how.  The use of 
“stingray” cell-site simulators is a prime example.  Law enforcement 
bent over backwards to keep their use of the devices secret, and faced 
the ire of judges for doing so.422  Their use began to be regulated and 
curtailed only after their use was more widely known.423  Keeping 
their use secret for so long impaired the judiciary’s constitutional 
oversight role.424 
In addition, Edward Snowden’s revelations about the National 
Security Agency’s bulk data collection programs also show how 
secrecy limits the judiciary’s effectiveness at overseeing law 
enforcement searches aided by powerful technology.425  When civil 
liberties groups sued over legislation that authorized the agency’s 
activities, the U.S. Supreme Court said they did not have standing to 
sue because any potential injury was, at that point, speculative.426  But 
after Snowden’s revelations showed the extent of those programs, and 
how members of the groups challenging them would be impacted, the 
Second Circuit said they could bring a challenge to the programs in 
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court.427  The limits imposed by justiciability doctrines like standing 
and the opaqueness of the technology at issue will slow any judicial 
response to abuses and limit the judiciary’s effectiveness at addressing 
these concerns. 
C. Privacy Protections Should Be a Prerequisite to a City Contract 
or Franchise 
The city should require its franchisees and contractors to adhere to 
binding, enforceable privacy principles as a condition of receiving or 
maintaining a franchise or contract.  Such a requirement will help 
protect New Yorkers’ privacy while also giving them the benefit of 
smart city initiatives.  The city can use its government contracting 
power as leverage to influence the contours of its own surveillance 
policy.428  Contractors have financial and other incentives to make the 
data they collect to others, but they also want to access lucrative 
municipal markets through franchise that cities control.429  New York 
could achieve its own objectives by applying its existing local policies 
that control data sharing and management to its franchisees, bringing 
surveillance policy back in line with local priorities.430 
Such steps could be taken when the city awards new franchises.  
Existing city regulations demonstrate that the city can embed privacy 
protections into the franchising process from the start.  The city 
already requires vendors to comply with other standards.  Vendors 
                                                                                                                 
 427. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 801 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting that “[a]ppellants 
here need not speculate that the government has collected, or may in the future 
collect, their call records”); see also id. at 802 (“There is no question that an 
equivalent manual review of the records, in search of connections to a suspect person 
or telephone, would confer standing even on the government’s analysis.  That the 
search is conducted by a machine might lessen the intrusion, but does not deprive 
appellants of standing to object to the collection and review of their data.”). 
 428.  See Woo, supra note 412, at 969 (discussing how Seattle renegotiated its 
contracts with a vendor to prevent the sale of traffic location data collected by 
sensors); see also Jan Whittington et al., Push, Pull, and Spill: A Transdisciplinary 
Case Study in Municipal Open Government, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1899, 1947–51 
(2015) (discussing findings of an assessment of the privacy provisions of Seattle's 
vendor contracts); cf. Catherine Crump, Surveillance Policy Making by Procurement, 
91 WASH. L. REV. 1595, 1598, 1601–04 (2016) (discussing how the vast sums of money 
that the federal government has given to local law enforcement agencies to purchase 
equipment have realigned cities’ surveillance policies with federal goals, and how 
cities can bring them back into line with local priorities). 
 429. See Whittington, supra note 412, at 929. 
 430. Cf. Crump, supra note 428, at 1660–61 (suggesting a realignment of police 
decisions with local policy choices by implementing such measures as requiring police 
to adhere to privacy policies and empowering a chief privacy officer); Whittington, 
supra note 412, at 929 (suggesting that cities impose restrictions on data usage and 
collection when contracting with third parties). 
2018] “WE KNOW NOT WHERE WE GO” 757 
must make sure passwords are secure and comply with the city’s open 
data regulations.431  The city charter also requires franchisees to 
recognize their workers’ unions.432 
The RFP that led to LinkNYC also established requirements of 
potential bidders, and future RFPs can make privacy protections a 
requirement, too.  Whoever took over the payphone franchises had to 
conduct environmental reviews, adhere to the requirements of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, follow building codes, permit free 
911 calling, and indemnify the city, among many other 
requirements.433  Numerous siting requirements, explaining how big 
or intrusive the physical structures can be on city streets, were also 
part of the RFP.434  The RFP even made it harder for contractors to 
win the franchise if they did not agree to the so-called “Macbride 
principles,” which date from 1991 and relate to alleged employment 
discrimination in Northern Ireland.435 
Future bidders could be told that they will be judged in part on 
how well they will protect users from the possibility of mass 
surveillance.  The city’s RFP contained a number of other provisions 
explaining how their bids would be judged.  Bidders were told that 
they would be evaluated on their legal, technical, business, and 
financial experience with running Wi-Fi and telephone networks in 
urban environments,436 as well as the “adequacy” of their software 
and information-sharing protocols.437  Perhaps most relevant, 
proposals would be rated on how they would “ensure that the public 
receives the maximum benefits available under the Franchise and that 
the benefits are shared equitably throughout the City.”438 
The final franchise agreement itself also has numerous 
requirements.  For example, it requires the kiosks to provide 
encrypted connections to secure users’ data.439  It even contains 
restrictions on advertising, prohibiting the kiosks from displaying ads 
for tobacco products.440  Adding privacy protections to the franchise 
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agreement can follow a similar form to those requirements that are 
already in place. 
The city should therefore incorporate such transparency 
requirements directly into franchise agreements.  New York has no 
shortage of private partners who should adhere to these principles.  
Besides LinkNYC, the city has other technology-focused franchises, 
including for Wi-Fi in the subways441; for telecommunications 
companies to place their equipment on poles for street lights, traffic 
lights, and utilities442; and some voice and data equipment along city 
streets.443 
Those requirements should include an explicit description of what 
data is collected and allow New Yorkers to see their own data.  The 
privacy policy should only be amended through an open, public 
process overseen and approved by the DoITT and the city council.444  
Teeth should be added to the agreements so violations can be 
challenged either by private litigation445 or by automatically 
withholding revenue from the franchisee or not renewing its 
franchise.  Indeed, the city has taken some steps, albeit tentative, in 
this direction.  In November 2017, the city requested information 
about how it could roll out broadband to all New Yorkers’ homes.446  
In its request, the city explicitly asked for those submitting 
information to explain how their suggestions would protect New 
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Yorkers’ privacy.447  The city plans to use the suggestions it receives 
to shape a formal request for proposals about in-home broadband.448  
By going further to make its privacy principles binding and 
enforceable, the city could achieve one of its smart city goals of 
government accountability and protect its citizens’ privacy at the 
same time.449 
CONCLUSION 
Using procurement and contractual control to ensure New 
Yorkers’ privacy rights is the most effective way to vindicate the city’s 
twin goals of closing the digital divide and making New York a “smart 
city.”  Judicial responses are too slow and muddled, and courts’ views 
often clash with public opinion.  Cities are not powerless; their 
leverage over local contractors sets a norm that can adapt to changing 
technology.  Requiring greater transparency about vendors’ data 
collection and punishing violators would advance the city’s policies, 
ensure that LinkNYC fulfills its goal of making New York City 
“smarter” and more equitable, and would be acceptable to 
technology companies that are already pushing for more openness 
about law enforcement’s use of their networks.  Greater transparency 
also allows courts and policymakers to respond when actions go 
beyond the scope of the Fourth Amendment450 or the public’s 
expectations of privacy.451  LinkNYC has not been immune from 
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unanticipated consequences.452  Shrouding LinkNYC in secrecy, 
however, makes it difficult for New Yorkers “to accept what they are 
prohibited from observing.”453  The kiosks can see just about 
everything that New Yorkers are doing.  It is time for New Yorkers to 
see everything that the kiosks are doing, too. 
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